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 Recommendation Based Trust Model with an 
Effective Defence Scheme for MANETs  
Antesar M. Shabut, Keshav P. Dahal, Sanat K. Bista, Irfan U. Awan  
Abstract—The reliability of delivering packets through multi-hop intermediate nodes is a significant issue in the mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs). The distributed mobile nodes establish connections to form the MANET, which may include selfish and 
misbehaving nodes. Recommendation based trust management has been proposed in the literature as a mechanism to filter out 
the misbehaving nodes while searching for a packet delivery route. However, building a trust model that relies on the 
recommendations from other nodes in the network is vulnerable to the possible dishonest behaviour, such as bad-mouthing, 
ballot-stuffing, and collusion, of the recommending nodes. . This paper investigates the problems of attacks posed by 
misbehaving nodes while propagating recommendations in the existing trust models. We propose a recommendation based 
trust model with a defence scheme that utilises clustering technique to dynamically filter attacks related to dishonest 
recommendations within certain time based on number of interactions, compatibility of information and node closeness. The 
model is empirically tested in several mobile and disconnected topologies in which nodes experience changes in their 
neighbourhoods and consequently face frequent route changes.  The empirical analysis demonstrates robustness and accuracy 
of the trust model in a dynamic MANET environment. 
Index Terms— Dishonest recommendation, filtering algorithm, mobile ad hoc networks, recommendation attacks, 
recommendation management, Trust management models  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
OBILE ad hoc networks (MANETs) are character-
ised by the lack of infrastructure (i.e. pre-existing 
communication backbone) and central authority (such as 
base stations or mobile switching centres) to establish and 
facilitate communication in the network [1]. It is com-
posed of a set of autonomous devices that work as net-
work nodes agreeing to relay packets for each other and 
have dynamic topologies, with resource constraints, and 
limited physical security [2]. MANETs’ applications are 
increasing in future network paradigms including vehicu-
lar and mesh networks.  Many civilian and military ser-
vices are demanding MANET applications, ranging from 
emergency rescue services such as hurricane and earth-
quake disasters to exchanging critical information on the 
battlefield or even home and personal area networking 
[3]. The formation and sustained existence of MANET 
services are mainly based on an individual node’s coop-
eration in packet forwarding. Due to the unique charac-
teristics and demanding use, MANETs are vulnerable to 
attacks launched by misbehaving nodes [2]. One of the 
approved mechanisms to improve security in MANETs is 
to use trust management techniques to deal with the mis-
behaving nodes and stimulate them to cooperate [4].  
Trust as a social concept can be defined as the degree 
of subjective belief about the behaviour of a particular 
entity [5]. Trust is being increasingly adopted as an im-
portant concept to design and analyse security problems 
in distributed systems to guide decision making [6]. Trust 
in MANETs is the opinion held by one node (known as 
evaluating node) about another node (known as evaluat-
ed node), based upon the node’s past behaviour and rec-
ommendations from other nodes (known as recommend-
ing nodes) in the network.  
Existing trust management frameworks for MANETs 
can be categorised into two types. The first establishes 
trust relationships between nodes based on direct interac-
tions only [7, 8]. The second type is based on direct obser-
vations of the node itself and recommendations provided 
by other nodes in the network [9, 10]. The use of recom-
mendation based trust technique can be advantageous to 
nodes in discovering misbehaving nodes prior to interac-
tion, thus avoiding a potential bad experience. Using rec-
ommendations, nodes in MANETs can make more in-
formed decision on the selection of routing path even if 
they did not have any direct interactions in the past [9]. 
Being acquainted with several distant nodes (not neigh-
bours) can be done sending a single packet to them, and it 
could help in saving energy [11].  
Together with the advantages comes the challenge of 
handling dishonest recommendations in MANETs. In 
absence of past interactions, a particular node might not 
be well informed to make an assessment of trustworthi-
ness of another node. In such cases, the evaluating node 
solicits recommendations from the evaluated node's 
neighbours (acquaintances) with whom it has a history of 
interaction. However, to maximise the gain of individual 
and their acquaintances, nodes could resort to dishonest 
behaviours through attacks such as ballot stuffing, bad-
mouthing  or colluding (refer Section 3 for details on at-
tacks). Such attacks could eventually lead to trust frame-
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work malfunction [12].  
Solutions proposed to tackle these problems are lim-
ited and not adequately effective [11-16]. For instance, one 
of the approaches [11] judges the honesty of the recom-
mending node by referring to their trust values. A rec-
ommending node with a high trust value is preferred and 
seen as a trustworthy one. However, a node can be trust-
worthy in terms of packet forwarding but could be a bad 
node as a recommending node. Filtering out dishonest 
recommending nodes becomes a serious problem when 
recommending nodes collude with each other to accom-
plish a malicious goal [17]. This may result in confusing 
and misleading the trust model in judging a nodes’ 
trustworthiness.   
To overcome some of these limitations, this paper pro-
poses a recommendation based trust model with a de-
fence scheme to filter out attacks related to dishonest rec-
ommendations like bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing, and 
collusion for mobile ad hoc networks.  The recommend-
ing node is chosen based on three factors to check its hon-
esty: number of interactions with the evaluated node, 
unity of view with the evaluating node for solving the 
problem of the scarcity of knowledge, and closeness to 
the evaluating node. Recommendations are accumulated 
over a period of time to ensure the consistency of recom-
mendations provided by a recommending node regard-
ing the evaluated node. Clustering technique is adopted 
to dynamically filter out recommendations between cer-
tain timeframe based on: a). number of interactions (using 
confidence value), b). compatibility of information with 
the evaluated node (through deviation test) and c). close-
ness between the nodes. Different nodes are chosen in the 
evaluation procedure to test the performance of the filter-
ing algorithm against various mobile topologies and 
neighbourhoods. 
2 RELATED WORK 
In recent years, different trust and reputation models 
have been proposed to enhance security in MANETs to 
enable nodes to evaluate their neighbours directly or 
through recommendations from other nodes in the net-
work. Though the proposed models have paid some at-
tention to the problem of dishonest recommendations, 
finding out effective mechanisms to eliminate or mitigate 
the influence is still a challenging problem for MANETs. 
CONFIDANT [18] uses the personal experience mech-
anism to deal with the problem of dishonest recommen-
dation. It applies the deviation test on the received rec-
ommendations and excludes the ones deviating above the 
threshold value. The reputation value of a recommending 
node is updated based on the results from the deviation 
test. The model cannot prevent the dissemination of false 
recommendation and negative recommendation is the 
only information exchanged between nodes [19]. Michi-
ardi and Molva [20] propose CORE model, which only 
accepts positive recommendation by others. Consequent-
ly, this can lead to decreased efficiency of the system be-
cause nodes cannot exchange bad experiences from the 
misbehaving ones in the network. Also, CORE cannot be 
resilient against ballot-stuffing attack as it leaves ways for 
misbehaving nodes to collude and gain unfair high rat-
ings. Wang et al. [21] propose a trust-based incentive 
model for self-policing mobile ad hoc networks to reduce 
the impact of false recommendation on the accuracy of 
trust value. However, the performance of the model is not 
tested against specific attacks such as bad-mouthing. Au-
thors in [22] propose RFSTrust, a trust model based on 
fuzzy recommendation similarity, which is presented to 
quantify and evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes. They 
use similarity theory to evaluate the recommendation 
relationships between nodes. That is, the higher the de-
gree of similarity between the evaluating node and the 
recommending node, the more consistent is the evalua-
tion between the two nodes. In this model, only one type 
of situation is considered when selfish nodes attack is 
present and the performance of the model is not tested 
against other attacks related to recommendation. Soltanali 
et al in [23], propose a model of trust to encourage the 
cooperation between nodes by using direct observation 
and recommendation. This model only accepts the last 
opinion of a node, which is passed to a reputation man-
ager system at the end of each interval. Considering only 
the last opinion is not insightful enough to recognise the 
fluctuation in node’s behaviour, like in on-off attack [12].  
In an attempt to increase the honesty of utilising recom-
mendations, Li et al in [10] include a confidence value in 
their evaluation by combining two values: trust and con-
fidence into a single value called trustworthiness. They 
utilise the trustworthiness value to put weight on recom-
mendations in which a recommending node with higher 
trustworthiness value is given more weight. Collusion 
attack in providing false recommendation is not consid-
ered by this work, and this may cause incorrect evalua-
tion of the received recommendations [5].  Hermes [13] is 
a recommendation based trust model that uses an addi-
tional parameter known as an acceptability threshold (in 
relation to the confidence level). The notion of acceptabil-
ity is used in the computation of recommendation to en-
sure that adequate observations of the behaviour of par-
ticipating node has been obtained. However, the selection 
of acceptability is a trade-off between obtaining more ac-
curate trustworthiness value and the convergence time 
required to obtain it. A recommendation exchange proto-
col (REP) is proposed by Pedro B. et al. [24] to allow 
nodes to send and receive recommendations from neigh-
bouring nodes. It introduces the concept of relationship 
maturity based on how long nodes have known each oth-
er. Recommendations forwarded by long term associates 
are weighed higher than that from short term associates. 
The maturity of relationship is evaluated on the basis of a 
single factor by considering only the duration of relation-
ship. Yu et al. in [25] propose a clustering technique to 
filter out trustworthy recommendations from untrustwor-
thy ones. They follow the majority rule by selecting the 
cluster with the largest number of recommendations as 
trustworthy one. They tested their model against some 
attacks like bad mouthing and ballot stuffing. However, 
majority rule could be ineffective as some nodes can col-
lude to perform an attack, and not provide an honest 
judgment about other nodes.  
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The aforementioned discussion highlights limitations 
of the trust models in their abilities to shield nodes from 
malicious behaviour in the network. It can be seen from 
the literature review that most of the models relied on 
single parameter to compute trustworthiness. To address 
these limitations, a defence scheme is proposed in this 
paper using multiple parameters (as specified in Section 
1) to compute the trustworthiness of recommenders. The 
model underlines the importance of social properties in 
evaluating trustworthiness and uses it in investigating the 
relation between closeness of nodes and similarity in be-
haviour.  The use of proof of time and location, missing in 
the current literature, is considered by the proposed 
model. False negative and false positive problems in 
evaluating the recommendation’s trustworthiness and 
their impact on the network performance are thoroughly 
investigated. 
3 ATTACKS RELATED TO RECOMMENDATION 
MANAGEMENT IN TRUST AND REPUTATION 
FRAMEWORKS 
It is indeed a challenge to safe guard a network against 
wide range of attacks. Recent focus of research in this area 
has been on the problems associated with misbehaving 
nodes in the context of packet forwarding, like blackhole 
or wormhole attack [26]. For quality assurance, it is im-
portant that trust management frameworks be resilient to 
attacks [10]. Although several research have put consid-
erable effort to protect the propagation and aggregation 
of recommendations in a trust model, research is still in 
its early stages [12]. The following attacks, namely, bad 
mouthing attack, ballot stuffing attack, selective misbe-
haviour attack, intelligent behaviour attack, time-
dependent attack and location-dependent attack (see Fig. 
1 for the classification of attacks), are targeted at the 
propagation and aggregation of recommendation [10, 12, 
27]. Location-dependent attack is used for the first time in 
this paper. The attack behaviours are summarised below:  
 Bad Mouthing Attack (BMA). In this type of attack, con-
spiring nodes propagate unfairly negative ratings of 
good nodes with an ill intent to tarnish their reputa-
tion in the network. Such collusive behaviour may 
lead to the blocking of valid paths in the network by 
confusing the trust and reputation management 
mechanism.  
 Ballot Stuffing Attack (BSA). Propagation of unfairly 
positive ratings for some poorly performing nodes by 
collusive nodes in the network lead to ballot stuffing 
attack. The intention of collusive nodes is to mislead 
the trust mechanism and cause it to malfunction in ac-
curately reporting the trustworthiness of assessed 
node. 
 Selective Misbehaviour Attack (SMA). This attack victim-
ises some trusted nodes by propagating false ratings 
for them, while at the same time acting normal to oth-
er nodes. This type of behaviour can be very difficult 
to detect for the trust mechanism. 
 Intelligent Behaviour Attack (IBA). This attack selective-
ly provides recommendation with high or low ratings 
according to the trust threshold. This kind of attack 
can cause malfunction to the trust framework by dy-
namically responding to trust threshold and behaving 
based on it.  
 Time-dependent Attack (TDA). This attack makes partic-
ipating nodes to change their behaviour by time. 
Nodes can behave normally for a period of time and 
can misbehave by providing unfair ratings at other 
times. This attack also has its roots in the subjective 
property of trust.   
 Location-dependent Attack (LDA). This attack exploits 
mobility property of MANETs, where a node behaves 
differently according to its location. This attack origi-
nates from the subjective property of trust where be-
haviours at one location cannot affect evaluating 
trustworthiness of nodes at another location.  
   The summarised attacks belong to two categories: false 
rating (BMA, BSA, and SMA), and inconsistent rating 
based on the trust threshold, time, or location (IBA, TDA, 
and LDA). Some of the countermeasures illustrated below 
can be used for both categories or being specifically de-
signed for one category. For example, [20] proposes the 
use of only positive recommendations, while [18]  uses 
only negative recommendations and this can counter-
measure attacks like ballot stuffing and bad mouthing. 
This kind of defence can be harmful to trust information 
because nodes cannot report their complete experiences. 
Statistical methods like Bayesian theory to accurately 
compute the correctness of recommendations can be a 
proper solution to both categories [27]. Proof of sufficient 
interactions [13], and specifying a certain threshold of 
negative and positive recommendation, besides, the ma-
jority opinion technique [25] could also be used to miti-
gate the effect of false and inconsistent rating.  Compari-
son between recommendation list and proof of time and 
location of the recommendation provider is also a promis-
ing solution to time and location-dependent attacks. , The 
method of comparing time and location is considered first 
time in the proposed algorithm. 
What follows from above discussion is that the rec-
ommending nodes' trustworthiness cannot be assessed by 
just a single scheme. It should be supported by using 
many behaviour and social properties (such as, the close-
ness between nodes, and proof of time and location) 
which are missed in the illustrated literature. In order to 
improve accuracy and robustness of the trust model, the 
influence of the untrustworthy recommendations should 
be mitigated to overcome the problem of false negative 
and false positive. 
4 THE PROPOSED MODEL 
We propose a recommendation-based trust management 
model to secure the routing protocol between source and 
destination nodes based on the trust value of each node in 
the path. The model considers the problem of the attacks 
discussed earlier due to some misbehaving nodes in 
MANETs. We make use of a Bayesian statistical approach 
similar to that used in [28] for computing trust values 
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based on the assumption that they follow a beta probabil-
ity distribution. Beta distribution is estimated by using 
two parameters (𝛼, 𝛽). They can be calculated by accumu-
lating observations of forwarding and dropping packets 
where 𝛼 represents the accumulation of positive observa-
tions (forwarded packets) and 𝛽 represents the accumula-
tion of negative observations (dropped packets). The beta 
distribution can be defined by gamma function as shown 
in Eq. (1). 
 
𝑓(𝑝|𝛼, 𝛽) =  
(𝛼+𝛽)
(𝛼)(𝛽)
 𝑝𝛼−1 (1 − 𝑝)𝛽−1   (1)   
where 0 ≤  𝑝 ≤ 1;  𝛼, 𝛽 > 0 with a condition that 𝑝 ≠
 0 if 𝛼 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 ≠ 1 𝑖𝑓 𝛽 < 1.  
Nodes in the network observe each other’s behaviour 
in order to construct a trust relationship representing the 
degree of trustworthiness one node can put on another. 
These relationships are useful to help nodes decide 
whether to forward packets to a specific neighbour or not. 
In the proposed model, an initial trust relationship is es-
tablished between two nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 as (𝛼𝑖𝑗 , 𝛽𝑖𝑗) at time 𝑡, 
where 𝛼𝑖𝑗 denotes the positive interactions observed by 
node 𝑖 about node 𝑗, and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 denotes the negative interac-
tions observed by node 𝑖 about 𝑗. At time 𝑡 = 0, we start 
with  𝛼𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽𝑖𝑗 =  1, which indicates the initial belief held 
by node 𝑖 about  𝑗. This value is translated into complete 
uncertainty about the distribution of the parameter which 
means no observation or evidence has been collected. If 
the estimated positive and negative interactions between 
two nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 are denoted as 𝜌 and 𝑛 respective-
ly,  𝛼𝑖𝑗  and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 would be calculated as  𝛼𝑖𝑗  = 𝜌 + 1 and 𝛽𝑖𝑗  = 
𝑛+ 1 where 𝜌 and 𝑛 ≥ 0. After each observation, the trust 
metric can be computed and updated from these parame-
ters as the expectation of beta distribution given by 
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
. 
The proposed trust model uses clustering technique in 
order to maximise the consistency of receiving recom-
mendations. For example, recommendations from a mis-
behaving node can have a range of multiple different rat-
ings for the evaluated node. These ratings may be incon-
sistent in which they can differ from each other in a short 
period of time, a malicious act of the misbehaving node to 
confuse the trust model. Dynamic clustering of the rec-
ommendations over a period of time can filter out deviat-
ed ratings from the list of recommendations, thus de-
creasing the influence of false estimations in computing 
trust value. The proposed model clusters recommenda-
tions based on three different criteria: (a) number of inter-
actions by the means of using confidence value, (b) com-
patibility of information with the evaluated node by the 
means of deviation test, and (c) closeness between these 
nodes. The use of multiple criteria to judge whether a 
node is dishonest can mitigate the influence of false nega-
tive and false positive ratings.  
The model has three components deployed to evaluate 
trust: (a) Trust Computation Component that uses direct as 
well as indirect (second hand) trust information. (b)  Rec-
ommendation Manager Component that requests and gathers 
recommendations for a node from a list of recommending 
nodes, and (c) Cluster Manager Component which filters 
out dishonest recommendations from the list and sends 
out a list of trustworthy recommendations to  the manag-
er component. Fig.2 shows the model’s components
 
Fig. 1. Attacks Related to Misbehaviour Problems in Recommendation Management of Trust and Reputation Frameworks
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and their interaction process. The recommendation man-
ager and cluster manager components are described in 
section 5. 
The trust computation component obtains direct trust 
value from two nodes that have already initiated a trust 
relationship. These two nodes can continue to interact 
with each other at least for a period of time they are with-
in the range. Direct trust value is considered to be accu-
rate and its computation invulnerable to dishonest rec-
ommendations. Direct trust value 𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑑 of node 𝑖 about 𝑗 is 
calculated as in Eq. (2).  
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑑 =
𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽𝑖𝑗
                    (2) 
Influence of past experiences change over time in a 
dynamic environment. It is thus important for a trust 
model to consider this change in influence. The proposed 
model incorporates a decay factor (µ) to gradually de-
crease the influence of past experience over time, prior to 
the aggregation with new trust values. Forgetting of past 
experiences is carried out by adjusting the time frame of 
observations while recording the positive or negative ex-
perience. However, trust decays over time even during 
inactivity periods and it is thus important to consider the 
diminishing impact of trust over the time. The first situa-
tion is when a node observes an additional new positive 
or negative interaction between time 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖+1 denoted 
as 𝜌𝑛𝑒𝑤 and 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤 , then the updated 𝜌 and 𝑛 should be 
reduced by the decay factor µ before merging them with 
the new values. Therefore, at time 𝑡𝑖+1, 𝜌 and 𝑛 is updated 
respectively according to the formula in Eq. (3). 
 
𝜌 = 𝜌𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗  µ + 𝜌𝑛𝑒𝑤   ,   𝑛 =  𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗  µ +  𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤       (3) 
where 0 ≤  µ ≤ 1, 𝜌𝑜𝑙𝑑 and 𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑 are the old positive and 
negative experiences observed by the node. The second 
situation is when there is no observed new positive and 
negative interaction between time 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖+1, then, at time 
𝑡𝑖+1, 𝜌 and 𝑛 is updated respectively as in Eq. (4). 
 
𝜌 = 𝜌𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗  µ  ,   𝑛 =  𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗  µ       (4) 
Indirect trust needs to be considered, when two nodes 
have not established a previous trust relationship through 
exchange of packets or any other form of communication. 
In such case, the evaluating node doesn’t have enough 
experience to judge the trustworthiness of the other node 
being evaluated. Indirect trust is also calculated using the 
beta-function, similarly as the direct trust was computed 
earlier. Indirect trust is actually the direct observations 
obtained by one node about its neighbours which can be 
used by another node as second-hand information. We 
can say that node  𝑘’s direct observations of node 𝑗 could 
be indirect or second hand information to another node  𝑖 
(given that node i and j have not interacted in the past). 
Therefore, indirect trust value is calculated using (𝛼𝑖𝑗
′ , 𝛽𝑖𝑗
′ ) 
and updated by two variables: 𝜌’, describing the number 
of positive interactions, and 𝑛’, describing the number of 
negative interactions. Further, 𝛼𝑖𝑗
′  and  𝛽𝑖𝑗
′  are calculated 
as 𝛼𝑖𝑗
′  =  𝛼𝑖𝑗
′  +  𝜌′ and 𝛽𝑖𝑗
′  =  𝛽𝑖𝑗
′  +  𝑛′ . If the evaluating 
node 𝑖 receives 𝛮 recommendations for the evaluated 
node 𝑗 denoted by 𝑘 =  1, 2, … , 𝛮, indirect trust 𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑖  of 
node 𝑖 about 𝑗 is calculated according to the Eq. (5).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Recommendation-based trust model components 
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𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑖 =  ∑
𝛼𝑘𝑗
′
𝛼𝑘𝑗
′ +  𝛽𝑘𝑗
′
𝑁
𝑘=1
            (5) 
While indirect trust information is important to incor-
porate in a trust model for MANETs, involving this kind 
of information can be vulnerable to intentionally generat-
ed dishonest recommendations. 
For each node in the network, trust value 𝑇𝑖𝑗 is calcu-
lated by combining both direct and indirect trust values 
with different weights denoted by 𝑤𝑑  and  𝑤𝑖  respectively.  
𝑇𝑖𝑗 is computed according to Eq. (6). 
 
 𝑇𝑖𝑗 =  𝑤𝑑 ∗  𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑑 +  𝑤𝑖 ∗  𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑖        (6) 
where 𝑤𝑑 +  𝑤𝑖 = 1. The weights are used because of their 
significant impact on diminishing the possibility of wrong 
trustworthiness evaluation of direct and indirect trust 
information by nodes.  In most of existing models, higher 
weight is usually given to the direct information as it is 
less prone to dishonest recommendation. However, MA-
NETs’ characteristics such as mobility and frequent 
change in topology make it difficult to completely trust 
the source of information even if it is the nodes self-
assessment. The weight in this model is dynamically cal-
culated based on the quantity and quality of interactions 
observed by evaluating nodes. If the evaluating node has 
enough experience about the evaluated node and the 
evaluated node is not compromised or prone to any envi-
ronmental conditions (e.g. node failure, or low energy 
level), it is given equal or more weight than indirect in-
formation. While, if the evaluating node is not able to 
judge the trustworthiness of the evaluated node, more 
weight is given to the indirect trust.      
5 CLUSTER-BASED RECOMMENDATION FILTERING  
This section analyses the functionalities of recommenda-
tion and cluster manager components and shows how 
they work together to filter out untrustworthy recom-
mendations. The proposed filtering technique takes into 
consideration the dynamic characteristics of MANETs 
that change over time. The honesty of recommending 
nodes is evaluated over a period of time to mitigate the 
influence of bad behaviour of the same node over time. 
Fig. 3 shows the dynamic topology of MANETs. Consider 
that, a node 𝑖 wants to evaluate another node 𝑗 by re-
questing recommendations from its neighbours. The 
evaluating node 𝑖 receives a list of recommending nodes 
referred as {𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, … , 𝑘𝛮). At time 𝑡𝑖 (refer Fig. 3(a)), the 
location and number of recommending nodes differ from 
the recommending nodes at time 𝑡𝑖+1 as shown in Fig. 
3(b).  
Recommendation manager in the proposed model 
works as an intermediate component between indirect 
trust computation and cluster manager components.  It 
helps in detecting and eliminating false recommenda-
tions. Recommendation manager has three important 
roles: (1) send recommendation request to the evaluating 
node’s neighbours; (2) collect received recommendation 
and send it to the cluster manger which runs the filtering 
procedure; (3) receive the filtered recommendation and 
send it back to the trust computation component. Rec-
ommendation manager requests and gathers recommen-
dation list for an evaluating node 𝑖 about node 𝑗 from a 
list of recommending nodes {𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, … . , 𝑘𝑁} between 
time 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖+1and send it to the cluster manager to run 
the filtering algorithm. After filtering, it receives the 
trustworthy clusters as a list of honest recommendations 
denoted as {𝑘1
𝑇𝑟 , 𝑘2
𝑇𝑟 , 𝑘3
𝑇𝑟 , … , 𝑘𝛮
𝑇𝑟}. The final task is to send 
the trustworthy cluster 𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦 to the requesting 
node. Algorithm 1 illustrates the recommendation man-
ager algorithm. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Recommendation by time 
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Algorithm 1: Recommendation Manager Algorithm 
1. For each recommendation request Do 
2.   Send request to neighbours 
3.   Collect received recommendations 
4.   Construct 𝐿 = {𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, … , 𝑘𝛮} 
5.   Send 𝐿 to the cluster manager for processing 
6.   Receive trustworthy cluster 𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦 = {𝑘1
𝑇𝑟, 𝑘2
𝑇𝑟 , 𝑘3
𝑇𝑟 , … , 𝑘𝛮
𝑇𝑟} 
7.   Send 𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦 to the requesting node 
8. End For 
 
Nodes are clustered based on three values, namely: 
confidence value, deviation value, and closeness value. The 
following subsections will explain these values and give 
an overview of the clustering process and its algorithm. 
 
A. Confidence Value 𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
 
The notion of confidence was introduced in [29] where 
confidence value and trust value are  combined together 
to derive a single trustworthiness value of a node. Follow-
ing that, trust models in [10, 13, 30] have also considered 
the confidence value as a desired parameter to achieve a 
single trust value to represent the trustworthiness of 
nodes. Confidence value can be used to solve the problem 
of short-term and long-term observations. That is, nodes 
may have the same level of trust with different number of 
observations. For example, the trust value of a node at the 
initial time with 𝛼 =  𝛽 = 1 is 0.5, and after a sequence of 
positive and negative interactions in which 𝛼 =  𝛽 = 50, 
the node has the same trust value of 0.5 about the evalu-
ated node (see Table 1 for more information). Confidence 
value starts from 0 in case of no observations between 
nodes and increases gradually with the number of rec-
orded observations. Relying only on the trust value can 
raise the problem of short-term and long-term observa-
tions. Nodes in the network can have nearly the same 
level of trust though they may have different levels of 
observations. Consequently, this can lead to wrong esti-
mation in judging the ability of nodes to be honest rec-
ommending node.  
The proposed filtering algorithm clusters recommend-
ing nodes based on the level of confidence for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the nodes with higher confidence value 
(those having sufficient interactions with evaluated node) 
are desirable because the higher number of interactions 
will offer rich information that would help in choosing 
better recommending nodes. Secondly, the recommend-
ing nodes with very high confidence value in the early 
rounds in the network (when there are no enough interac-
tions) are more likely to be attackers. Consequently, it 
may lead to exclusion of dishonest nodes from the rec-
ommendations list in early stages. The confidence value is 
computed as the variance of the beta distribution with 
some modifications as in [10] and [13]. Nodes use the con-
fidence value to make a correct decision about the trust-
worthiness of recommending nodes taking into account 
the number of observations accumulated by each node. 
Suppose that 𝑖 is an evaluating node that received rec-
ommendations from a recommending node 𝑘, confidence 
value 𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
 is calculated as in Eq. (7).  
 
𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
=  1 −  √12𝜎𝑖𝑘 
 
𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
= 1 − √
12 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝛽𝑖𝑘
(𝛼𝑖𝑘 +  𝛽𝑖𝑘)2(𝛼𝑖𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖𝑘 + 1)
       (7) 
 
where  𝜎𝑖𝑘 is the beta distribuation varience between 𝑖 and 
𝑘, 𝛼𝑖𝑘 and 𝛽𝑖𝑘 is the accumulated positive and negative 
interactions between 𝑖 and 𝑘. 
   Using this formula the value of confidence falls be-
tween the interval of [0, 1], where 0 means that no pre-
vious interactions are recorded between the evaluating 
and evaluated node while 1 means complete confi-
dence in the evaluated node. The rational of using and 
computing the confidence value is shown in Fig. 4. We 
compare the confidence value computed using the 
 
TABLE 1. LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE PROPOSED MODEL AND TMUC MODEL WITH THE SAME TRUST LEVELS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
α β s f Trust value 
Confidence value 
(proposed model) 
Confidence value 
(TMUC model) 
1 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.916666667 
5 2 4 1 0.714285714 0.446716665 0.974489796 
10 4 9 3 0.714285714 0.595938982 0.986394558 
15 6 14 5 0.714285714 0.666357595 0.990723562 
20 8 19 7 0.714285714 0.709401356 0.992962702 
25 10 24 9 0.714285714 0.739179735 0.994331066 
30 12 29 11 0.714285714 0.761351694 0.995253916 
35 14 34 13 0.714285714 0.778686666 0.995918367 
40 16 39 15 0.714285714 0.792721071 0.996419620 
45 18 44 17 0.714285714 0.804384801 0.996811224 
50 20 49 19 0.714285714 0.814277976 0.997125611 
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proposed method with that in [31] (we call it TMUC for 
short), which computes the confidence value using only 
the standard deviation.  The proposed computation 
method of confidence value can effectively reflect the 
knowledge held by nodes based on the number of interac-
tions better than the calculation in TMUC. For example, 
when 𝛼 =  𝛽 = 1 which means there is no previous inter-
action between two nodes, the proposed method of com-
puting confidence value is 0 while in TMUC, it is nearly 
0.91 which is a high value close to 1. Starting with high 
confidence value in case of no interactions can confuse the 
trust mechanism and prevent it from making good 
judgement about behaviour of the evaluated node. Table 1 
shows the values of positive and negative interactions 
and the confidence value for each level of interaction for 
both the proposed model and the work in TMUC. Fig. 4 
explains the relationship between interactions and the 
level of confidence when the trust levels are the same.   
From Fig. 4, it can be seen that the proposed method of 
computing confidence offers a better range for the confi-
dence value as compared to that by TMUC. This variation 
reflects better accumulated interactions when the trust 
values (refer Table 1) are same. When there are no interac-
tions, confidence value from the proposed model is 0 and 
it progresses with the increasing number of interactions. 
Whereas with TMUC, the confidence value is already at 
0.91 in case of no interactions and thus is nearly at satura-
tion level when number of interactions more than 19.  
 
B.  Deviation Value 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣 
Deviation value represents to what extent the received 
recommendation is compatible with the personal experi-
 
Fig. 4. Relationships between Interactions and Confidence for the 
proposed model and TMUC model 
ence of evaluating node. This value has been used by the 
means of the deviation test in [18] to ensure the unity of 
view with the receiving node. Each node compares re-
ceived recommendation with its own first-hand infor-
mation and accepts only those not deviating too much 
from self-observations. In the proposed model the devia-
tion value is used as an additional parameter in the clus-
tering algorithm to filter out any recommendations devi-
ating beyond a predefined deviation threshold. A prob-
lem that could arise here is when the evaluating node 
lacks historical information for interactions with the eval-
uated node, thus not providing a base value for compari-
son. In order to overcome this problem, the proposed 
method compares the confidence level of the evaluating 
node with that of the recommending node. The confi-
dence value is calculated using Eq.(7). The deviation test 
is only applied if both nodes have similar level of confi-
dence.  Assume that there are three nodes (𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑘), and 
node 𝑖 attempts to calculate the trust value of its neigh-
bour node 𝑗 using recommendation provided by node 𝑘. 
In this scenario, node 𝑖 first compares its confidence level 
which denoted as 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 with the recommending 
node as in Eq. (8). If the confidence difference is less than 
a threshold value denoted as 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑, then node 𝑖 
calculates the deviation value as a difference between the 
receiving recommendation and direct observations of the 
evaluated node as held by the evaluating node as in 
Eq.(9). The resulting value is compared to a predefined 
deviation threshold 𝑑 and we exclude any recommenda-
tions that differ widely from the evaluating node’s own 
information.  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =  |𝐶𝑉𝑖𝑗 −  𝐶𝑉𝑘𝑗| ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓_𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑      (8) 
 
where  𝐶𝑉𝑖𝑗  is the confidence value of 𝑖 about 𝑗, and 𝐶𝑉𝑘𝑗  
is the confidence value of 𝑘 about 𝑗. If the Eq. (8) is suc-
cessful, deviation value 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣 is calculated as follows. 
 
𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣 =  |𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑑 −  𝑇𝑘𝑗
𝑟 | ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣      (9) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑑 is the direct trust value of 𝑖 about 𝑗, and 𝑇𝑘𝑗
𝑟  is 
the received trust value of 𝑘 about 𝑗. 
 
C.  Closeness Centrality Value 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  
Trust is a social concept and it is thus possible to apply 
the perceptions of social life in trust computation and 
recommendation propagation. An interesting direction 
of trust research in MANETs is to utilise social relation-
ships in evaluating trust among nodes in a group set-
ting by employing the concept of social structures [5]. 
The proposed model uses the concept of closeness cen-
trality between the evaluating nodes and the recom-
mending node from the social trust.  Closeness centrali-
ty [32] measures the distance between the evaluated 
node and the recommending node in terms of  physical 
distance, number of hops, or delays. In the proposed  
model closeness centrality is a measure of the distance 
between the evaluating node and the recommending 
node. The use of the closeness centrality enhances the 
filtering algorithm as close nodes are likely to possess 
0
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same nature and counter nearly same environmental and 
operational conditions over a period of time in the net-
work. Furthermore, close friends may have more interac-
tions in the time of friendship. Consequently, trust values 
for the close neighbours converge to nearly same level. 
This may help in recognising the untrustworthy recom-
mending node whose recommendation is much different 
from the close recommending nodes. Closeness value 
𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 refers to the degree of node 𝑖’s closeness to a rec-
ommending node 𝑘 at time 𝑡 and is calculated by Eq. (10). 
 
 𝑉𝑖𝑘
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 =  √(𝑥𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑐 − 𝑥𝑘
𝑙𝑜𝑐)2 + (𝑦𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑐 − 𝑦𝑘
𝑙𝑜𝑐)2   ≤  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠       (10) 
 
where (𝑥𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑐, 𝑦𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑐), (𝑥𝑘
𝑙𝑜𝑐, 𝑦𝑘
𝑙𝑜𝑐) are the positions of node 𝑖 
and node 𝑘 at time 𝑡 and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠 is a predefined distance 
threshold between node 𝑖 and node 𝑘 which should be 
less than the transmission range. 
  
D.  Cluster procedure 
The cluster manager in the proposed model receives a list 
of recommendations from the recommendation manager 
and processes it using a clustering technique. The cluster-
ing algorithm is run by the evaluating node on all the rec-
ommendations in the list 𝐿 = {𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, … , 𝑘𝑛}. A vector of 
three values (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
, 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣 , 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒) is provided by a recom-
mending node for the clustering operation. The clustering 
algorithm divides the vectors from the recommending 
nodes into a predefined number of clusters denoted as K. 
Initially each vector is considered as a cluster, and then 
two clusters with the shortest Euclidean distance are 
merged together to produce a new cluster. The clustering 
process is repeated by merging two clusters from the pre-
vious iteration until the predefined number of clusters K 
is reached. The first step of the clustering process aims to 
merge vectors with the closest similarity. In the second 
step, it selects the trustworthy clusters if all the recom-
mending nodes in a specified cluster satisfy the following 
rules: 
𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦 = {
   𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑦
 𝑖𝑓 (𝑉
𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 ≥  𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
) and (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
≤  𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓)
                        𝑖𝑓   (𝑉
𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣  ≤   𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣) and (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 ≤  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠) 
𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑈𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦
                                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
where  Rij
Trustwothy
 is the trustworthy recommendation,  
Rij
Untrustworthy
 is the untrustworthy recommendation,  dmin
conf 
is the minmum confidence threshold,  dmax
conf is the maxi-
mum confidence threshold. 
The next step is to apply majority rule to select the 
cluster with largest number of members. In the final step, 
trustworthy clusters are returned to the recommendation 
manager and to the evaluating node to update its indirect 
trust of the evaluated node. The proposed cluster process 
works as shown in Algorithm 2. 
 
Algorithm 2: Cluster Manager Algorithm 
1.   For each recommendation list 𝐿 Do 
2.      For each rating vector in the list (𝛼𝑟 , 𝛽𝑟) Do   
3.         Calculate confidence value 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓
 as in Equ. 7 
4.         Calculate deviation value 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣 as in Equ. 8, 9 
5.         Calculate closeness value 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 as in Equ. 10 
6.         Construct data vector as (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 , 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣, 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒)   
7.      End For 
8.      Initialize each vector as a unique cluster 
9.      Repeat  
10.        For each vector Do 
11.           Merge two clusters with the shortest Euclidean distance 
12.        End For 
13.    Until number of clusters = 𝐾  
14.    For each cluster that appeared in the previous iteration Do 
15.       If (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 ≥  𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓) and (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 ≤  𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓) Then 
16.          If (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑒𝑣  ≤   𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑣) and (𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 ≤  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠) Then 
17.             Select trustworthy cluster 
18.          End If 
19.       End If      
20.    End For 
21.    For each chosen trustworthy cluster Do 
22.       Apply the majority rule 
23.       Return trustworthy cluster 𝐶𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑦 
24.    End For  
25.  End For 
 
6 SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
The simulation is conducted using NS2 simulator[33], an 
open-source discrete event simulator designed to support 
research in computer networking. It involves various 
modules to help test several network components such as 
packet, node, routing, application and transport layer 
protocol. NS2 features permit us to extend the DSR rout-
ing protocol that supports MANETs architecture. The 
proposed trust model components are added to the simu-
lator to test the validity of the proposed model. A net-
work with 50 mobile nodes is simulated randomly mov-
ing in an area of 700×700 square metre. Several nodes are 
randomly selected to provide false rating information in 
the form of bad-mouthing and ballot-stuffing attacks. 
There are 15 source-destination pairs and each source 
transmits 2 packets per second with a Constant Bit Rate 
(CBR), and pause time 60s, which is the time nodes need 
to pause to begin travelling to the next destination with a 
speed of 10 m/s, the packet size is 512 bytes and the simu-
lation time is 500s. The mobility model utilised in this 
paper is the random way point which is the most com-
monly used model in ad hoc networking research [34] It 
is easy to use and movement could be considered as real-
istic which is very similar to the real world movement 
[35]. However, the proposed model can fit any other type 
of mobility models like RPGM model [36]. The maximum 
bad-mouthing and ballot-stuffing attacks percentage used 
in the simulation scenario is 80% misbehaving nodes, 
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING,  MANUSCRIPT ID 
 
which is enough percentage to test these attacks. An op-
timistic scheme is used in choosing trust threshold value 
at 0.2 in which all nodes are initially expected to be trust-
ed and normally behaving [10]. Table 2 shows the param-
eters used in configuring the network for the experiment. 
Bad-mouthing and ballot-stuffing attacks with additional 
permission to collude in both attacks are used in order to 
evaluate the defence scheme against dishonest recom-
mendation. Number of dishonest nodes range from 0% to 
80% and the dishonest recommendations provided devi-
ate 50% from the honest recommendations. Badly behav-
ing nodes (selfish nodes) counting to 20% always existed 
in the network and were responsible for collusion and 
jamming. Results from the experiment are based on mul-
tiple runs and a negligible variation is noticed. 
 
TABLE 2. NETWORK CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS 
Parameter Value 
Nodes 50 
Area 700 m X 700 m 
Speed 10 m/s 
Radio Range 250 m 
Movement Random waypoint model 
Routing Protocol DSR 
MAC 802.11 
Source-destination pairs 15 
Transmitting capacity 2 Kbps 
Application CBR 
Packet size 512 B 
Simulation time 500 s 
Trust threshold 0.4 
Publication timer 30 s 
Fading timer µ 10 s 
Deviation threshold ddev 0.5 
Conf_Threshold 0.4 
𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 0.5 
𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 0.9 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠 200 m 
 
A. Performance Evolution  
The flow of the simulation is as follows. The performance 
of the entire network is represented by two parameters: 
Network throughput and Packet loss in the presence of 
bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing and selfish nodes. The trust 
value of a good node (not misbehaving) is evaluated 
against bad-mouthing attack to see the influence of such 
attack with and without incorporating the proposed de-
fence scheme. The trust value of a bad node (misbehav-
ing) is also evaluated against ballot-stuffing attack to see 
how such attackers can distort the trust value of this 
node.  The performance of the proposed model in terms 
of recognised dishonest recommendations, false negative 
and false positive in the presence of bad-mouthing attacks 
with and without the defence scheme is examined. Simi-
lar experiment is conducted for ballot-stuffing attack. Fi-
nally, a comparative study is conducted with the maturity  
model [24] proposed in the literature.      
    Fig. 5 demonstrates the effect of dishonest recommen-
dation on two performance metrics; throughput and 
packet loss for the whole network. The y-axis in Fig. 5(a) 
shows the percentage of throughput, both with and with-
out the defence scheme, in the presence of dishonest 
nodes varying from 0% to 80% of the total population of 
nodes. It is observed that the network throughput with-
out a defence falls from nearly 80% when the dishonest 
nodes are not present to nearly 30% when their popula-
tion increases to 80%. Slight decrease and then increase is 
noticed in the throughput (Fig. 5a) for the network with 
defence when the percentage of dishonest recommenda-
tion nodes increases from 40% to 80%. This may be due to 
the fact that the throughput not only depends on the 
number of misbehaving nodes but is also affected by the 
degree of connectivity (number of neighbours),ability of 
the nodes to classify their neighbours and the time re-
quired to achieve the classification (which are different in 
each simulation due to network topology and mobility). 
However, the proposed defence mechanism was able to 
keep the value of throughput at nearly 80% even in case 
of higher population of the dishonest nodes. This can be 
translated as the defence scheme’s ability in mitigating 
the negative effect of dishonest recommendations on the 
throughput performance. The impact of dishonest nodes 
on packet loss is shown in the Fig. 5(b). The percentage of 
packet loss rises with increasing the percentage of dis-
honest nodes from 20% to over 60% when no defence in-
corporated in the network. While only 20% packet loss 
can be maintained using the proposed defence scheme in 
the presence of dishonest recommending nodes that vary 
from 0% to 80% of the nodes in the network. Similarly, 
the percentage of packet loss decreases slightly when the 
percentage of dishonest recommendation nodes increases 
from 70% to 80% for the same reasons as discussed in the 
analysis of Fig. 5(a). It can be seen from the above analysis 
that dishonest recommendations can significantly impact 
the throughput and packet loss metrics by confusing the 
trust model. The proposed technique can keep those met-
rics at an acceptable level even when the population of 
dishonest nodes is high. 
Fig. 6 demonstrates the average of the indirect trust 
held by other nodes in the network for a good node (node 
12 in this case) and a bad node (node 4 in this case). The 
x-axis in Fig. 6(a) displays the range for the population of 
bad-mouthing nodes from 0% to 80%.The y-axis shows 
the average of the indirect trust value for a good node 
(node 12 in this case) as held by all the nodes that have 
interacted with it in the past. A comparison has been 
made between three different parameters as follows. First, 
the indirect trust value when there are no dishonest 
nodes, called expected value. Second, the indirect trust  
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Fig. 5. Network performance in the Presence of Dishonest Recommending nodes for a) Network Throughput; b) Network Packet Loss  
 
value when dishonest nodes are present and the defence 
scheme is working, with defence. Third, the indirect trust 
value when the dishonest nodes are present and the de-
fence technique is not working, no defence. It can be seen 
that with increasing population of badmouthing attack-
ers, the average trust value of node 12 declines in case of 
no defence, whereas, the trust value remains the same as 
the expected value in case of with defence. 
The effects of ballot-stuffing attack are shown in Fig. 
6(b). In the x-axis is the percentage of ballot-stuffing at-
tack that varies between 0% to 80% and y-axis shows the 
values for the indirect trust compared against the same 
three parameter i.e. expected value, with defence and no 
defence cases. From the figure, it can be seen that the at-
tacking nodes have propagated unfairly positive rating 
for the dishonest node (node 4) thereby raising its trust 
value to above 0.9 while the attacker population was 80%.  
The results here show that the defence algorithm is capa-
ble of mitigating the influence of dishonest nodes by fil-
tering out unfair ratings. 
To test the proposed defence scheme further, we de-
fine three additional metrics: (a) recognised proportion, rep-
resenting the number of dishonest recommendations 
identified by node 𝑖, (b) false negative proportion, indicating 
the number of dishonest recommendations identified as 
honest by node 𝑖,(c) false positive proportion, indicating the 
number of honest recommendations identified as dishon-
est by node 𝑖. Fig.7 and 8 show the results for these three 
metrics in the presence of bad-mouthing and ballot-
stuffing attack. The x-axis in Fig.7(a) shows the percent-
age of bad-mouthing attack while y-axis shows the pro-
portion of the recognised dishonest recommendation, 
false negative and false positive with the defence scheme 
in action. It can be observed that the defence algorithm 
can effectively mitigate the dishonest recommendation 
propagated by the bad-mouthing attackers regarding the 
recognition and false negative metrics. While it keeps the 
false positive proportion at a very low level (about 2%) 
when the attack percentage is more than 50%. Fig. 7 (b) 
shows the case when the defence scheme is not in action. 
It can be seen that the proportion of recognised dishonest 
recommendation drops to less than 10% when the per-
centage of dishonest nodes increase to 80% and conse-
quently the  proportion of false negative increases with 
the increase in dishonest recommending nodes. As the
 
Fig. 6. Trust Evaluation for a) Good-Node 12's Trust Value in the Presence of Bad-mouthing Attack; b) Bad-Node 4's Trust Value in the Pres-
ence of Ballot-stuffing Attack
(a) Good-Node 12's Trust Value (b) Bad-Node 4's Trust Value 
(a) Network throughput (b) Packet Loss 
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defence scheme is not in action here, it accepts all the rec-
ommendations propagated in the network and updates 
the indirect trust value based on these recommendations. 
Therefore, the proportion of false positive remains at zero 
(Fig 7(b)).  
Fig. 8 (a) shows results for ballot-stuffing attack. The 
proposed defence scheme is seen to be identifying dis-
honest recommendations and eliminating false negative 
effectively. The proportion of false positive is maintained 
at a reasonable level. The effect of dishonest recommen-
dation in Fig. 8(b) is obvious. When there is no defence 
incorporated the proportion of recognition drops from 
about 0.9 to nearly 0.1 with variation of the ballot-stuffing 
attackers from 0.1 to 0.8. The false negative proportion 
also increases to nearly 0.9 with the increasing percentage 
of the dishonest recommending nodes.   
Finally, the performance of the proposed model is 
compared with the maturity model proposed in [24] in 
terms of two metrics: trust level error (TLE) which repre-
sents the proportion of error in evaluating the trust level 
of a node 𝑖 (node 8 in this case); and trust level evaluation 
of a good node (node 1 in this case) by another node 𝑗 in 
the network. We follow the same network configuration 
and node selection which is provided in the maturity 
model ( see [24] for details) to conduct this experiment. In 
this configuration, a high speed network is presented 
with high node mobility,  which is different from our first 
configuration. This configuration of the test network al-
lows us to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.  
Fig. 9 shows the results of this experiment. Fig. 9(a) dis-
plays the trust level error over the simulation time. It can 
be seen that the proposed model can keep the TLE small-
er than the error reported by the maturity model. The 
TLE in case of the proposed model is stable for the entire 
time of evaluation and converges to very small value 
nearly 0.01 towards the later phase. While for the maturi-
ty model, the TLE value is high initially (0.35) as com-
pared to that of the proposed model and this only con-
verged to 0.1 towards the end (time unit 3000). Fig. 9(b) 
shows the effectiveness of the proposed defence scheme 
in evaluating the trust value of 
 
Fig. 7. Recognised, False Negative, and False Positive Proportion in The Presence of Bad-mouthing Attack for a) With Defence; b) Without 
Defence 
 
Fig. 8. Recognised, False Negative, and False Positive Proportion in The Presence of Ballot-stuffing Attack for a) With Defence; b) Without 
Defence 
(a) With Defence (b) Without Defence 
(a) With Defence (b) Without Defence 
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Fig. 9. Comparative study with maturity model for a) Trust Level Error; and b) Good-Node 1’ Trust Level
a good node (node 1) from the network. It considers the 
following scenarios: the expected trust value when there 
is no dishonest recommendation (TLNDR), and the same 
when there is 35% dishonest recommendation (TL35DR) 
both for the proposed model and the maturity model.  
The results show that the proposed model with the de-
fence scheme can manage to avoid the dishonest recom-
mendation and keep the trust value of node 1 near to the 
expected value and slightly higher than the results of the 
maturity model. 
B. Cost of the defence scheme  
 
Mobile Ad-hoc networks are characterised by constrained 
resources in terms of communication, memory usage and 
computational complexity requirements. Any proposed 
model or defence scheme must reflect the trade-offs be-
tween accuracy of trustworthiness and network perfor-
mance. As gathering and propagating trust information 
among distributed node can consume more resources of 
energy and time, it can enhance the decision making. Dy-
namic and highly mobile networks which suffer from 
several points of failure require techniques to enhance the 
decision making on nodes trustworthiness. However, the 
proposed defence scheme is lightweight in several as-
pects. In terms of communication, the proposed model is 
suitable for MANETs because only recommendation re-
quest and reply packets are used to send and receive a list 
of recommendations.  The packets of recommendations 
are exchanged between a single source of information 
which is represented in the recommendation manager to 
and from the evaluating node and the recommending 
nodes.  The data size and length is very small as every 
recommending node provides just three parameters of 
accumulated positive and negative observations and its 
current position. The communication is also enhanced by 
on-demand scheme in which recommendation is request-
ed whenever needed. Therefore, the defence scheme is 
conducted without network flooding and acquisition de-
lay. The defence scheme is characterised with the ad-
vantage of a role-based management scheme for filtering 
dishonest recommendation in which three different com-
ponents are interoperated to accomplish the task. The use 
of clustering in distributed networks can facilitate the 
data aggregation and reduce the computational power by 
each node to evaluate the trustworthiness of other nodes. 
One of the costs put on the proposed defence is the com-
plexity that can be countered in maintaining the cluster 
and selecting the most trustworthy cluster. Another cost 
is the memory consumption in which the defence scheme 
consumes more memory to store recommendation for a 
period of time for conducting the filtering algorithm by 
the recommendation and clustering managers which is 
run by the evaluating node but no memory consumption 
on the side of the evaluated node. An additional cost is 
the time consumption which is more than the traditional 
defence which uses single recommender information to 
update the trustworthiness of the evaluated node. These 
costs can be reduced in the proposed defence scheme by 
using only the very last recommendations to be including 
in the clustering filtering computation. Dynamic selection 
of the number of recommendations based on a period of 
time can have many advantages, (1) reduce complexity 
and memory usage, (2) exclude any old recommendation 
from the calculation, (3) reduce the time that is used to 
select the trustworthy cluster.    
7 CONCLUSION 
A recommendation based trust model with a defence 
scheme is developed and analysed to filter attacks related 
to dishonest recommendation exchanged by nodes in the 
MANET.  The use of recommendation can efficiently al-
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low nodes to acquaint with each other without previous 
interactions but it exposes nodes to dishonest and unfair 
recommendation. Therefore, the proposed defence 
scheme utilises the clustering technique to filter out unfair 
recommendations exchanged by nodes in the network 
based on three values: (a) the level of confidence held by a 
node about others, (b) deviation threshold which ensures 
the unity of views between evaluating node and the eval-
uated node, and (c) closeness centrality value to ensure 
that recommending node is a close friend to the evaluat-
ing node for a period of time. The proposed model is test-
ed by extensive simulation in terms of throughput and 
packet loss, against both bad-mouthing and ballot-
stuffing attacks, and also compared with other proposal. 
The simulation results indicate that the proposed defence 
scheme can safely incorporate correct indirect trust evi-
dences received by recommendations and eliminate un-
trustworthy ones. Moreover, it reduces the effect of false 
negative and false positive problems in selecting recom-
mending nodes. The proposed model can be extended by 
weighting recommendations based on time and location 
to mitigate the influence of location and time dependent 
attacks.  
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